

Regarding the Animal

On Biopolitics and the Limits of Humanism in Public Administration

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ABSTRACT

This article traces the anthropocentric orthodoxy of public administrative thought and scholarship to suggest how non-human animals give shape to the field's theoretical discourse and inform, in important and unspoken ways, its everyday practice. Even critical approaches in public administration remain rooted in anthropocentrism and speciesism and do not offer fundamental alternatives to mainstream approaches. The article outlines several of the limiting and violent consequences for animals and humans of this anthropocentric mode of thought and ordering and suggests how this process, described as "radical othering," connects with other, more widely explored, human-to-human forms of marginalization in the field. It concludes by outlining personal, disciplinary, regulatory, and institutional possibilities for imagining a different kind of relationship with nonhuman animals.

Man is the subject of administration.

—Emmette Redford,
Democracy in the Administrative State

Democracy can only be conceived if it can freely traverse the now dismantled border between science and politics, in order to add a series of new voices to the discussion, voices that have been inaudible up to now: *the voices of nonhumans*.

—Bruno Latour, *Politics of Nature*

As the globe faces the portents of ecological collapse, the complex implications of the new biosciences, and the mounting desire of many to forge a more sustainable and less cruel political economy—among other profound challenges—the time is auspicious and necessary, if not overdue, for public administration to reexamine the relationship of humans and other entities of the “natural” world. No doubt the field, to some extent, has struggled with aspects of these matters—for instance, in its engagement with the question of law in scientific inquiry and, more relevantly for our discussion, in postmodern and critical interrogation of the status of human nature (e.g., McSwite, 1997b). In a prescient piece, Lynton Caldwell (1964/1973) brought attention to the relevance of the emerging biosciences for governance; explorations continued by Meyer-Emerick (2004) and Farmer (2008).¹ In important related discussions, Larry Luton (2001b) and colleagues (Cawley, 2001; Reed, 2001, 2003; Timney, 2001) exposed the anthropocentrism, or human-centeredness, of the field and called for an “ecocentrism” that would be “centered on ecological values and concerns, on an understanding of humans as one species among the millions that live on the planet” (Luton, 2001a, p. 7).² Richard Box (2008) further has contended that a reorientation of public administration must involve a reworking of its relationship with the natural environment. Provocatively, Chris Reed (2001) advocated for the agency of the nonhuman world to be recognized and restored.

Unfortunately however, the conversation about the question of humans, animals, and nature largely went dormant in the 2000s (see Leuenberger & Bartle, 2009, and Robertson & Choi, 2010, as exceptions). Public administration scholarship did not advance its theoretical inquiry into further examination of human nature and the status of the biological, and, more important for present purposes, it *did not seek to incorporate other, nonhuman animals into its purview* (an exception may be Barnes, 2010). The human/animal divide was not crossed. Indeed, as we will contend, the division was reasserted in a new form.

This is especially regrettable for public administration because a range of pressing problems, like those noted above and others discussed below, intersect with and have an impact on the field and its practices in profound ways. Moreover, as we hope to show, traversing the human/animal division holds promise for shaking our thought into new spaces and opening our political imagination. If Catlaw’s (2007) analysis of the biopolitical constitution of the administrative state is correct, contemporary life requires that public administration articulate a different mode of biopolitical relationship—the relationship of the political, the biological, and the natural—as an indispensable element in formulating new forms of democratic government (see n. 1 for further discussion of our usage of biopolitics).³ In light of these conditions, this article seeks to reengage and rearticulate the discussion about humans/animals/nature in public administration and to challenge anew its anthropocentric, humanist orthodoxy.

SCOPE OF THE ARGUMENT

The topics and problems we outline in this article are complex and contentious. They can be, moreover, often very strange and unsettling. As such, we want to map explicitly the scope of our argument and our rationales for delimiting it in the manner we do and to state clearly how the argument seeks to advance the field's conversation in general, and this symposium in particular.

First and foremost, we begin this project within the fundamental frame of *the relations of the human animal and nonhuman animals*. We focus on nonhuman animals, as opposed to an ecological or environmental perspective, for several reasons. First, exploration of the human/animal divide forces us to confront the basic ways in which humans seek to differentiate themselves as biological or natural entities, to trace the role of cultural production in establishing that differentiation, and to make clearer the ethical and political implications of these structuring categorizations and distinctions. In fact, we will contend that this divide is at the heart of modernist public administration. Further, this focus enables us to see the roots and consequences of anthropocentric modes of theory and practice, which are severe.

Second, animals are everywhere in public administrative practices and regulations (food regulation, scientific testing, animal control, environmental and wildlife management, police response to nuisances, and so on), and yet they are *absent entirely* from public administration scholarship (except Barnes, 2010; Reed, in press), save as objects or metaphors. This is a significant lacuna in our scholarship.

Third, although animals are absent in our scholarship, they persist in and maintain the public administrative world *through their exclusion*. That is, their nonpresence defines a *speciesist* site upon which the field has been constructed and upon which, so we will argue, other relationships of hierarchy (race, gender, ability) have been raised and reinforced.

Fourth, inclusion of the animal-other brings to the fore a confrontation with the mind and agency that nonhumans possess and, by necessity, human rationalizations for the profound objectification and mass killing to which nonhuman animals are subjected on a daily basis in the global political economy. Unlike many forms of human-on-human violence, the mass killing of nonhuman animals is largely justified and carried out today through the processes of industrial-scale *commodification*. These living, sentient organisms are produced to be sold, used, and consumed by human beings, and, as we detail, these political-economic relations are rooted in anthropocentric and speciesist assumptions about nonhumans.

These assumptions sustain both the primary industries that produce objectified animals for exchange and the global secondary and tertiary commercial enterprises that depend on byproducts of the production and killing of nonhuman animals. So deep is the penetration and dependence of contemporary

human society on the trade in nonhuman animals (described below) that some critics juxtapose the contemporary political economy of nonhuman animals with the nineteenth-century slave trade (Spiegel, 1997). Indeed, although the animals humans eat and wear are the most visible to us, virtually every object that the reader of this article has encountered and will encounter today will have some kind of animal product or byproduct in it (Wise, 2002, pp. 10–11). In sum, any serious thinking about alternative political-economic and governance arrangements must take account of these biopolitical realities. A different biopolitics, a different administrative practice, must reconsider humans' mass production of nonhuman animals for commercial use and consumption.

But we want to be clear: We are *not* arguing for or against an “ecocentric” or “biocentric” public administration. Rather, here we critique public administration as an anthropocentric, speciesist enterprise (a certain biopolitical relationship) in an effort to rekindle the conversation about human/nature in governance studies and to show the import and possibilities for making a place for nonhuman animals in contemporary governance as more than objects and instruments for human ends.

Further, we are not advancing an absolutist, culturally and historically myopic argument regarding the use and the killing of nonhuman animals. We do *not* take the view that such use is categorically out of bounds. Rather, we contend that mass-industrial, depersonalized, mass-commercial production and killing of nonhuman animals should be troubling to us all and reflects a deeply embedded and radical attitude of objectification of the world. At a basic level, following Donna Haraway, we hold that “it is a misstep to separate the world’s beings into those who may be killed and those who may not and a misstep to pretend to live outside killing.” At this moment in our studies, we agree with Haraway: The problem is to learn to “live responsibly within the multiplicitous necessity of killing and labor of killing, so as to be in the open” (2008, pp. 79–80). As we suggest, the category “animal” is a central mechanism for making the distinction between entities who may be commodified and killed and those who may not be acted upon in this way.

In this connection, we emphasize that the overarching frame for the article is *not* animal *rights* but rather biopolitics. Although invariably we touch on some aspects of legal protection and recognition, we share skepticism that a “rights discourse” may be a narrow, problematic basis for articulating an alternative biopolitics (see Oliver, 2009, pp. 25–48, for an excellent summation of this view). In this connection, we do not seek to anthropomorphize nonhumans (i.e., to say that animals are just like humans, only *furrier* [A. Wachhaus, personal communication, July 19, 2011]—although some of this is unavoidable given the limits of our current language). This is a reductionist move that suppresses the exploration of differences among and between animals. However, we do assert, again, that nonhuman animals are more than just mere commodities for human consumption and objects or instruments

for meeting humans' needs, and, as such, they warrant a degree of political and scholarly recognition and existence that has been denied them by our philosophical assumptions and everyday practice.

We advance our argument as follows: The first section of the article traces the anthropocentric orthodoxy of public administrative thought and scholarship to suggest how nonhuman animals give shape to the field's discourse through their exclusion. While many have excavated the Cartesian foundations of the field, we advance this work further by presenting Descartes's low view of nonhuman animals; a view that is "common sense" today. In this context, we then show that even critical approaches in public administration (Waldo's, organizational humanism, and antihumanistic discourse theory) remain stranded in this anthropocentric, Cartesian territory and so do not offer fundamental alternatives to mainline approaches. *Anthropocentrism is the orthodoxy in public administration that needs to be overcome.*

The section following establishes the ubiquitous presence of nonhuman animals in everyday public administration practice and so identifies a major lapse in the field's research. But we also show how the category of "animal" is used in statute and local ordinance both to demean nonhuman animals and to establish hierarchies among them. The third section deploys the contemporary language of speciesism to show some of the violent consequences of this mode of thought. The practices and scope of industrial, commodified killing are detailed. We characterize this process as the "radical othering" of nonhuman animals and draw connections to other forms of racial, gender, and sexual othering to show how the category of animal is used to marginalize and dominate the human animal as well. The final, concluding section sketches personal, disciplinary, regulatory, and institutional possibilities for actualizing a new mode of biopolitics.

ANTHROPOCENTRIC PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

In a 2001 *Administrative Theory & Praxis* symposium, Larry Luton rightly stated, "Public administration is currently an anthropocentric enterprise; it is centered on human values and concerns" (2001a, p. 7). Given the pervasive efforts of governments to dominate nature and nonhuman life during the twentieth century (Box, 2008), we take this point as given. However, to render explicit this anthropocentrism in the field's own discourse, we outline the Cartesian rationalization for the diminishment of animals, and then we show how an anthropocentric attitude toward nonhumans persists in critical, heterodox theories. This inhibits a fundamental reorientation of governance.

Cartesianism, Anthropocentrism, and the Human/Animal Dichotomy

The Cartesian foundations of public administration have been well excavated elsewhere (Farmer, 1995; McSwite, 1997a; Stivers, 2002), although the ques-

tion of the animal has not been broached in these analyses. Our contention here is that the Cartesian discounting, if not outright contempt, for nonhuman animals carries over into our field and indeed constitutes an integral part of its foundation—as it does in other domains of the social sciences (see Bryant, 1979; Noske, 1993).

The rhetorical and categorical sleights of hand that human beings in the West (and elsewhere) have used to justify relationships and practices of the most profound and persistent cruelty among the species are well known and catalogued. Women have been denied souls, intelligence, and most other valued capacities, as have those classed as slaves or “inferior” races, tribes, groups, and so on. Indeed there are instances in which so profound a gap between the (white, male, straight . . .) Judger and the Judged (black, indigenous, female, gay . . .) Other is posited that those *Homo sapien sapiens* are denied membership in the human species itself. They become less than human, “mere” animals or “bare life” (Agamben, 1998), entities stripped of any and all membership in a political community. But what about nonhuman *animals themselves*? How did association with animals become grounds for exposing living organisms to diminishment and terror? How did it become acceptable to view animals as mere animals?

The elements of such modernist orthodoxy were assembled over many centuries. However, as in many areas, the legacy of the modernist denigration of animals can visibly be traced to Descartes. The core “contribution” of Descartes to the question of human-animal relationships turns on his assertion that animals do not possess a mind and are not capable of conscious thought. Although his view carried over the Christian view that the possession of reason grounded the divide between humans and animals, Descartes made this principle into a “building block of Enlightenment thought” (Bulliet, 2005, p. 45). For Descartes, *being* is equated with *thought*. We know humans can think because they can express these thoughts through speech and language. To the objection that animals communicate he replies, “although animals easily communicate to us, by voice or bodily movement, their natural impulses of anger, fear, hunger, and so on, it has never yet been observed that any brute animal reach the stage of using real speech, that is to say, of indicating by word or sign something pertaining to pure thought and not to natural impulse” (p. 61).

So, the capacity to speak and use language does not just indicate the capacity to think but also grounds a critical distinction regarding the categorical, *ontological* difference in capacities, and so of status, between humans and animals: “There are two different principles causing our motions: one is purely mechanical and corporeal and depends solely on the force of the spirits and the construction of our organs, and can be called the corporeal soul; the other is the incorporeal mind which I have defined as thinking substance” (Bulliet, 2005, p. 61). Humans and animals may share many similar biological organ-

isms and be moved by the passions; but animals do not have incorporeal mind or soul: The human body “is not just a self-moving machine but contains a soul with thoughts,” and “if [animals] thought as we do, they would have an immortal soul” (p. 60). Finally, while Descartes claims not to “deny life to animals” (p. 62), it is clear that they are just machines—automatic, soulless, and speechless. By contrast, humans are characterized by their ability to speak, to reason, and conquer instinct; and on this basis, humanity claims a right, “in its quest for mastery over nature, to manipulate, exploit, and ultimately consume or discard nature’s machines” (p. 45). As we will note later in this article, both propositions—that animals lack the capacity to speak and, more important, that this lack indicates the absence of mental states—are, in fact, dubious.

Anthropocentrism in Public Administrative Thought

In our reading of the theoretical scholarship of the field, it is less a matter of the conscious diminishment of nonhuman animals, *pace* Descartes, as much as it is the way in which this assumption enables the view that public administrations exist to advance specifically *human* purposes.

In *The Administrative State*, Dwight Waldo (1948/2007) contends that the impetus for the creation of public administration was the conservation movement of the early twentieth century. He writes, “The idea of saving natural resources soon developed into a social philosophy—saving human beings; and ultimately into the idea of a ‘planned’ and ‘administered’ human community” (p. 5). So, while the field was founded in conjunction with the conservation of natural resources, its intent was, Waldo asserts, “saving human beings.” Resources were to be conserved to the extent that they served the ends of human survival. No place was made for nonhumans, and this certainly frames how the early field, in Waldo’s assessment, conceived of the “complete administrator”: “A public administrator ‘should have a knowledge of the place of the public service in its relationship with basic economic and social forces and some realization of the potentialities of government as a means of meeting human needs’” (p. 99).

As is extensively documented in related historical and philosophical literatures, nature is portrayed in the early field, too, as needing domination. Waldo characterizes the field’s affinity for scientific management as an “eighteenth- and nineteenth-century notion of a natural harmony of nature” that humans need to control:

There is a harmony of nature, but it does not bring the greatest good of the greatest number simply by not being disturbed—that is the wrong interpretation. Man [*sic*] must discover this harmony, and impose his will upon it. No, not ‘impose’; the laws of nature will suffer no interference. But by a cosmic stroke of good fortune the Laws of Nature and the Real Will of man coincide! (pp. 58–59)

Waldo further shows the anthropocentric orientation of the field in his critique of the “Good Life” and the “Good Society” (pp. 66–67). He writes:

There is no doubt that if the Good Life is achieved man [*sic*] will have risen above his environment and made it subservient to his dreams. This applies to his social as well as his non-social environment. The means by which this will be achieved is by an extension of the outlook and the techniques of Science. The “power controlling sciences” will be developed equally with the “power producing sciences.” Government and administration, properly conceived and scientifically developed, will make man Master of his Soul; they will realize what political philosophers have only dared dream. (p. 67)

While Waldo is an important source for examples of anthropocentrism in the formative years of a so-called self-conscious field of public administration, we suggest that, unfortunately, he also falls prey to the same lapses as the early progressives, advocates of scientific management, the compleat administrator, and the good life. He concludes his treatise by posing a question that is anthropocentric: “The question is this: Are students of administration trying to solve the problems of human cooperation on too low a plane?” (p. 211).

The anthropocentric point of view is further evident in the critical and heterodox theories in public administration representing what Denhardt (2011) calls “organizational humanism.” Denhardt describes this disparate group of theories and empirical research emerging from the tumult of the 1960s as encompassing three broad themes: a concern for participatory, more employee focused forms of management to meet the demands, first, of organizational efficiency, and second, of planned organizational change; and third, an argument for the importance of organizational (i.e., bureaucratic, rationalized) society and the situation individuals confront regarding their freedom, morality, and responsibility within it (p. 94). Among the advocates of one or more of these propositions are Robert Golembiewski, Chris Argyris, and some of the Minnowbrook I attendees, such as Larry Kirkhart. To this list, we would add Denhardt (1981) himself, the early Orion White (1969), and Ralph Hummel (1994).

To paint with an admittedly broad brush, this collection of important theorists seek to *recenter* and *de-objectify* human beings and their relations, although the general “plane” of engagement has shifted from the societal to the organizational level. There is much that we admire in their texts, in particular the refocusing on patterns of relationship within organizational settings and the questioning of the primacy of organizational goals (at the expense of human purposes and striving). Still, these theories are *humanisms* that simply do not open to the broader nonhuman world and entities and, to that extent, remain narrowly *instrumental* insofar as organizations themselves are redescribed

as problematic or of interest insofar as they meet or fail to meet specifically *human* purposes and development.

Perhaps the most radical efforts to place public administration on a new footing—one that explicitly seeks to *decenter* the heritage both of scientific management *and* of humanism—have come from postmodern, linguistically based discourse theories (Farmer, 1995; Fox & Miller, 1995). Indeed, “postmodern” debates in public administration during the 1990s and 2000s focused on one critical aspect of biopolitics: the problem of human nature. Most forcefully in our view, in *Legitimacy in Public Administration* O.C. McSwite (1997b) argues that the field had wandered into an intellectual cul-de-sac simply by virtue of its implicit ontological commitment to a static human nature. This, McSwite argues, is exemplified in the Friedrich-Finer exchange that frames “the issue of human nature, which is inevitably a part of the debates on questions as generic as this one, as a matter of whether human beings are ‘good’ (can be trusted to be responsible, etc.) or ‘bad’ (cannot be trusted to pursue ends outside their own and be responsible to a principle or the public interest)” (p. 43). They continue that this represents a *static* ontology which assumed “that people *have* a nature: that is, they *are* one way or the other, generally, either ‘good’ or ‘bad.’ It therefore excludes the alternative assumption that human nature is not a property or an essence but a *dynamic*, emergent condition that is produced by a *process* of interaction” (p. 44).

McSwite’s contention was that this question, as framed by Friedrich-Finer, is fundamentally irresolvable as an empirical matter, and so no unequivocal normative position could be derived from human nature. Other texts by McSwite argued against any kind of normative content to human nature as well as any static biological content, and by extension against any kind of teleological or developmental humanism (McSwite, 1995, 2005), such as advanced by organizational humanists. We would concur with these conclusions.

The “decentering” of the human subject in linguistic signification by postmodern discourse-based antihumanism certainly stripped the human animal of much of its status as the measure of all things.⁴ However this approach falls short in two related ways. First, it paradoxically institutes a linguistically grounded antihumanistic *humanism*. In other words, humans are viewed as animals that speak (or symbolize); consistent with the legacy of post-Kantianism (see Braver, 2007), they are subjects of language, sealed off in a mediated world of appearance without direct access to the world. However, there was an apparent payoff to this movement into language, namely the possibility of consciousness itself (or, perhaps, at least a specific modality of consciousness; see McSwite, 2008). This is seen clearly in McSwite’s own Lacanian position. However, this intellectual move leaves untouched the central Cartesian postulate that what differentiates humans ontologically from, and elevates them over, animals is the capacity to speak: No language, no consciousness or mind. Nonhuman animals are left untouched as behaviorally reactive or

as mere machines, stripped of the possibility of consciousness and mind by virtue of the fact that they do not possess (human) language.

Setting aside objections rooted in variations on the Cartesian view, one could respond, in a vein sympathetic to yet preserving of the core division, that (a) there is nothing unreasonable in conceiving humans as speaking animals, and (b) human language merely circumscribes the constitution of *human-animal* consciousness, thereby leaving open the possibility that animal “languages” might enable other forms of mind, consciousness, or mental states—which research suggests is a more than plausible hypothesis (for a sampling, see Armstrong & Botzler, 2008). But this reply is insufficient for at least three reasons.

First, by insisting on operationalizing “human” in terms of language, we posit a one-dimensional representation or formal model of the human being (Catlaw, 2007) that appears to exhaust the ways in which a human can exist or, to rephrase, the conditions for the possibility of a properly or “true” human existence. To mitigate this, at best possession of language or speech would need to be joined with other distinguishing manners of being and intervening in the world or, in another register, displaced for the physiological and neurological structures that enable speech and human cognition and also condition humans’ experiences of their worlds. A single “black swan,” moreover, contests the terms of the model.⁵ For example, and to continue the bird theme, if humans are the animals that speak, what are we to make of Alex (1976–2007), the famous gray parrot who, in Irene Pepperberg’s laboratory at MIT, acquired human language and problem-solving skills comparable to those of a small child (Wise, 2002, pp. 87–112)? Or, for that matter, of humans (*Homo sapiens sapiens*) who have not developed the capacity to speak, for reasons, say, of social deprivation?

One could reply, then, that these examples may be dismissed as anomalies, since they emerge in settings that are not typical of the “natural” states in which humans and birds live. But this objection only further underscores the problem of ontologically categorizing an organism in terms of posited capacities, since it does not address the objection directly but merely shifts the ground of the argument from the natural characteristics of the organism to an idealized (ergo, normative) interplay of organism and environment within which expression of natural or typical capacities is manifested. (This is a problematic position *especially* for human animals and the multiplicity of environments in which they live.)

Second, the formulation is not all that instructive with regard to its own core category of “consciousness.” For the parrot-who-speaks-English, what kind or form of consciousness may we ascribe to him on the basis of consciousness *qua* language alone? Three decades of research indicated that Alex could mentally represent objects, could manipulate abstract categories, meant what he said (i.e., he didn’t arbitrarily assign words to objects but was

intentional), and had a sense of self-awareness (i.e., differentiated between usage of “I” and “you”). This sounds a lot like human consciousness but, as Wise writes, Alex’s “evolutionary distance from humans is so great [some 330 million years] that . . . [his] cognitive abilities are analogous, not necessarily homologous, to ours” (2002, p. 112). Thus, we suggest, modulating our attention viz. language also opens new routes to considering consciousness, cognition, and agency.

The simple point in these replies is that the antihumanistic humanism that sees humans in Cartesian terms does not help us make sense of contemporary animal research like that about Alex, and, in the end, narrows the kinds of questions we might ask about humans. Crossing the Cartesian divide lets us disclose a world of more nuance and shades of gray; although such a move provokes us to consider nonhuman animals as more than mute, reactionless objects and instruments and, as such, necessarily unsettles much that (modernist) humans take for granted about their uniqueness.

Third, and allied with the previous comment, the reply still leaves non-humans as entities of interest only to the extent that they are phenomenally presented to human consciousness (see Harman, 2011). As Kelly Oliver details in her magisterial critical survey of continental philosophy’s (dis)regard for animals, the “concepts of subjectivity, humanity, politics, and ethics continue to be defined by the double movement of assimilating and then disavowing the animal, animality, and animals. . . . animals remain the invisible support for whatever we take to be human subjectivity, as fractured and obscure as it may become” (2009, p. 4). Humans, indeed, are reduced by antihumanist decentering but then are radically separated again from and elevated over other animals (and certain other humans) in the linguistic turn; the imprisonment in language paradoxically becomes new ground for privileging humans. Generally speaking, animals continue to be interesting only insofar as they serve human ends or differentiate humans, and this divide, moreover, generates symbolic space in which to shift or “animalize” certain groups and categories of humans.

Continental thought, of course, is not unique in these matters. The characterization of nonhuman animals as lacking language, and so mental states, is widely shared in analytic philosophy and biological science (Allen & Bekoff, 1997). We have focused on continental discourse theories in particular because they inform the critical vanguard of public administrative thought in ways that those scholarly traditions do not. But to raise these objections is not to advocate a move away from using these tools as much as to map their limits. To conclude and summarize, then: The limitations of these discourse-based approaches are that they continue to adhere to the humanism of the field’s founding and humanistic critiques. They continue to privilege, isolate, and problematically essentialize the human animal, but now via language. This shift raises serious issues about the status of humans who do not, cannot, or

will not speak (Patterson, 2001) and forecloses inquiry into the ontological status of nonhuman animals as such. As Oliver concludes, “We cannot de-center the human subject without also calling into question the animal other” (2009, p. 5). To date and to the best of our understanding, until now no one has provoked this question in public administration.

ANIMALS: NOWHERE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH, EVERYWHERE IN PUBLIC SERVICE WORK

The presence through exclusion of nonhuman animals inhibits the advance of public administrative theory. Moreover, their presence through exclusion represents a major problem in terms of practice in two ways: First, it ignores a vast domain of public life and public service workers and their work; and second, it shields our eyes from the replication of anthropocentric categorization and language in everyday, mundane administrative life.

Animals in Public Administration Research

Regrettably, even when animals appear in public administration research, they do so mostly only as metaphors or objects. As in everyday speech, so, too, in public administrative discourse is our academic writing saturated with representations of animals. There are the expected, perfunctory mentions of humans as “social animals” or “political animals.” But other animal metaphors abound: hair of the dog, the dog that did not bark, top dog, tail that wags the dog, teaching an old dog new tricks, and so on. Administrative and political dynamics are described as “cat-and-mouse games.” Budget tricks are dubbed “throwing the dead cat” over the fence, and there is always more than one way to skin a cat. But beyond these metaphors, nonhuman animals are not acknowledged at all, and even in articles dealing with animals, the animals themselves are not of interest. They are objects or background pieces, where they could be protagonists (e.g., Fiori, Brunk, & Meyer, 1992). We will discuss an important, hopeful exception later in the article.

This neglect is significant and, in our view, symptomatic of the field’s deeply entrenched humanism. While we have not been able to locate data regarding the total number of government workers who engage in public service with animals, a simple Web search for “government jobs and animals” reveals the ways in which governmental workers interact with animals directly and indirectly. Thousands of public administrators work in labs (and labs funded with federal money) that use (and kill) animals in scientific research; zoos and aquariums; various areas of fish and wildlife management; national, state, and local parks; livestock, chicken, and other food regulation; animal training and control, to name just a few.

Animals are also a near-ubiquitous part of citizens’ lives and a major aspect

of daily citizen-citizen interaction, and a cause for interaction of citizens and government (e.g., calls to police about barking dogs). According to market research performed by the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA), in households across the United States, there are more than 72 million dogs, 81 million cats, 11 million birds, and 7 million horses owned as pets or companion animals. In addition, there are nearly 11 million livestock estimated to be part of households across the nation (AVMA, 2007). These large numbers of companion animals and livestock require an enormous amount of infrastructure to be maintained and cared for; there are also an enormous number of stray animals, of which the ASPCA estimates the number of cats alone to be more than 70 million.

To service all these animals, the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that in 2008 that there were some 59,700 veterinarians, 79,600 veterinary technologists and technicians (who perform duties for veterinarians similar to those of a nurse for a physician), 75,000 veterinarian assistants and laboratory caretakers, 220,400 animal care and service workers (e.g., trainers, groomers, kennel attendants, zoo keepers), 14,700 animal breeders, and 16,000 animal control workers (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). In short, animals and people who care for and work with them are everywhere in public life.

Law and Regulation of Nonhuman Animals

A significant body of law and ordinance concerns the regulation of animals and their human owners. There are laws and statutes that address the manner of life and death an animal may have while living within a community. An examination of federal, state, and local laws is a fruitful way to identify the differentiation of humans and nonhumans in public administrative practice. Our discussion here is, by necessity, brief but, we hope, also suggestive.

Each level of government encompasses different domains of regulation regarding animals, but they also often overlap (e.g., prohibition of cruelty against animals can be found in statutes at all levels). At the federal level, a key piece of legislation is the Animal Welfare Act of 1966, which regulates the treatment of animals in the laboratory. "It has become the only Federal law in the United States that regulates the treatment of animals in research, exhibition, transport, and by dealers" (USDA, 2011, p. 24). This federal law has been amended several times, most recently in 2008, and it now "prohibits any person 'to knowingly sponsor or exhibit an animal in animal fighting venture,' or 'to knowingly sell, buy, possess, train, transport, deliver or receive any animal for the purposes of having the animal participate in an animal fighting venture'" (Cohen, 2008, p. 11). The Animal Welfare Act is enforced by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) along with the Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the Animal Care Agency. Other

major federal laws include the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, the Horse Protection Act, and the Twenty-Eight-Hour Law.

While these laws seek to prevent the mistreatment of animals, albeit in a limited scope, they also serve as precedent for why we need to create a place for nonhumans in the governing process, insofar as they demonstrate the need to address the excesses of the human/animal divide. We illustrate this through a closer analysis of the language of some local administrative ordinances.

Local laws concerning the regulation of animals focus on the care and welfare of farm animals, the humane slaughter of animals, animal cruelty, animal sales at retail pet stores, importation regulations, and the “disposal of animal carcasses” (USDA, 2011, p. 11). These ordinances are littered with diminutive and degrading language that reduces animals to a subhuman level and permits certain acts, which would be thought of as horrific were they committed against other humans, to be performed on nonhumans animals. They also show the difficulty of neatly drawing the lines between different kinds of animals, humans included. We start with the definition of “animal” from the city of Mesa, Arizona (also commonly found in other municipal codes), which defines “animal” as “Any animal of a species that is susceptible to rabies, except man” (Mesa City Code. § 6(4)(1)-(9). Animal Control Ordinance with Leash Law, 2011). This introductory definition provides an outline of the orientation that elevates humans above all else, as even “animal” is defined in terms of what can harm human beings, rabies. Of course, humans can also contract and transmit rabies, yet they are exempt from this definition of animal.

Another example of administrative language that enables humans to commit acts of violence against animals is the use of the term “destroy” instead of “kill.” The Mesa code states, “The enforcement agent shall destroy a vicious animal” (Mesa City Code. § 6(4)(1)-(9). Animal Control Ordinance with Leash Law, 2011). Again the language employed demonstrates a different standard and value attributed to nonhuman animals. Interestingly, however, there is a hierarchy within this category, as not all *nonhuman animals* are subject to this treatment. Some are elevated to special position—for example, police dogs: “Dogs utilized by the Mesa Police Department are exempt from the requirements of this ordinance” (Mesa City Code. § 6(4)(1)-(9). Animal Control Ordinance with Leash Law, 2011). So, animals can be vicious and bite humans without being “destroyed,” but only when in the service of law enforcement agents. This example also points to the ways in which the category of “animal” operates symbolically *across species* and *types of nonhuman animals* to establish hierarchies and domains for permissible actions.

The creation by humans of hierarchies of nonhuman animals is further evidenced by the diminished status of commodified animals (i.e., animals bred for slaughter, used in research, rodeos, zoos, and circuses to name just a few). As Otto (2010) observes, animals used for commercial purposes are exempt from many animal cruelty prohibitions in state laws across the United

States and Canada. In Utah, for example, the term “animal” is defined in a such a way that commodified animals are referred to as “creatures” and as such are not awarded the protections afforded to companion animals (Utah Code Ann. § 76(9)(301). Cruelty to Animals, 2010). In North Dakota, people are prohibited from overworking, mistreating, or abandoning animals unless they are participating in the North Dakota state fair and other displays of caged animals like “livestock or poultry exhibitions” and zoos (N.D. Cent. Code § 36(21.1)(02). Overworking, Mistreating, or Abandoning Animals, 2010). In Rhode Island, imprisonment is the punishment for anyone who “cuts out the tongue or otherwise dismembers any animal, maliciously, or maliciously kills or wounds any animal,” but this prohibition does not apply to “hunters during hunting season or a licensed business killing animals for human consumption” (R.I. Gen. Laws § 4(1)(5). Malicious Injury to or Killing of Animals, 2010). These exemptions are not exceptional but, rather, are the rule when dealing with commodified animals.

So, not only are animals an important location for thinking in light of their ubiquity in practice, but it is in practice, too—here in the most mundane details of local and state ordinances—that many of humans’ assumptions about animals are institutionalized and reproduced.

OTHER, COMMODIFY, KILL: CONSEQUENCES OF SPECIESISM

In contemporary language, the Cartesian onto-normative hierarchization of nonhuman animals is called speciesism.⁶ In this section we describe some of the brutal practical consequences of speciesist logic, which we call a practice of *radical othering*, and we outline how it intersects with other, ongoing areas of public administrative concern, such as the othering practices of racism and sexism.

Over 40 years ago, the philosopher Richard Ryder coined the term speciesism while contemplating the “human oppression of animals. Why did it go unchallenged? Why did otherwise decent and humane people take it for granted that it is alright to treat sentient animals worse than slaves—like mere unfeeling commodities?” (2003, p. 83). The account of Descartes provided earlier gives us some manner of reply to Ryder’s questions. But Ryder continues that, like the terms sexism and racism, speciesism is aimed “to fracture the established view” that prejudices are “natural and, therefore, acceptable” (p. 83). Peter Singer (1975) further developed the concept of speciesism in his foundational book *Animal Liberation*. In his rebuttal to a critique of the book, Singer seeks to elucidate the term, which he acknowledges has caused some misunderstanding:

My target is “speciesism” which, as the name implies, is the view that all members of our species have some special status lacked by members of

any other species. In my book I document the prevalence of speciesism in our society at some length and frequently make the point that we treat animals in ways in which we would not think of treating even grossly and permanently defective human beings. (1978, p. 120)

Despite Singer's ugly terminology, that is, "defective human beings," his definition of speciesism gets to the core of the issue: that organisms excluded from the human species are often treated as mere things, thereby rationalizing the most egregious acts committed against them.⁷

Precisely what kinds of acts against animals does speciesist reasoning rationalize? We offered some description of the consequences in the section on law and ordinances. However, as Marx shifted his gaze to the factory floor in his analysis of the relations of capitalist production, here we want to turn our attention to realities faced by nonhuman animals in mass industrial factories, conditions enabled and permitted by law and ordinance, themselves undergirded by the anthropocentric presumptions of philosophical humanism.

To begin, consider that nonhuman animals are slaughtered on a scale and in ways that most people do not appreciate:

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), over 50 *billion* land animals worldwide were killed for food in 2005. The number of individual fishes killed by humans may be higher still. Close to 100 *million* mice, rats, rabbits, monkeys, cats, dogs, and birds are consumed *yearly* in American laboratories. Between 40 and 70 *million* mourning doves are shot by hunters yearly. The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) estimates that 50 *million* animals are killed for their fur each year around the world. (Balcombe, 2010, p. 14, emphasis added)

Further, the Humane Society estimates that 9 *billion* chickens and turkeys are killed for food in the United States alone (up from 1.6. billion in 1960). The numbers are staggering.

Equally staggering is the manner in which many of these animals are confined and killed, how they live and die. Many animals (cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep, and swine) in the United States are covered under the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1958. The act broadly requires that animals be unconscious before slaughter, although in reality enforcement has often been lax. However, the act does not address humane *conditions* of confinement. Consider the conditions of most commercial veal production:

The young calves, stressed by separation from their mothers, are placed in narrow wooden stalls, lined up row on row in the confinement building. For between eighteen and twenty weeks, each calf is confined to a space scarcely larger than its own body, and is tied at the neck to restrict movement. He is fed "milk replacer," a liquid mixture of dried milk

products, starch, fats, sugar, antibiotics, and other additives. The milk replacer is deficient in iron to induce subclinical anemia—a necessary condition if the producer’s calves are to have flesh white enough to fetch the market price for “prime” veal. No hay or other roughage is permitted, for that too would darken the flesh. Even the wooden stalls and neck chains keep the calf from licking his own urine and feces to satisfy his craving for iron. (Mason & Finelli, 2006/2007, p. 162)

Amazingly, birds, fish, and rabbits actually are *exempt* from the act—and birds make up some 95% of land animals slaughtered in the United States. In the case of chickens, the “vast majority . . . are first hung upside down on metal shackles by their legs and then stunned using an electrified water-bath system before they are killed” (Shields & Raj, n.d., p. 1). The electric bath is intended to immobilize the birds and render them unconscious. However, many birds fall off the shackles and drown in the baths; others are not shocked unconscious; and there is growing concern that the birds experience pain during and after the shocks, since they may not produce instantaneous unconsciousness (p. 3). Other, gas-based killing methods (known as Controlled Atmosphere Stunning and Controlled Atmosphere Killing) are in less widespread use but also have limitations.

In egg-producing hatcheries, male chicks, one half of the “crop,” are killed outright because they do not lay eggs. These chicks, “by the millions are thrown into plastic bags to be crushed or suffocated. Large scale hatcheries have moved towards the use of gas affixation or ‘macerators,’ which grind up the live chicks at high speed” (Mason & Finelli, 2007, p. 160).

Speciesism and Violence Toward the Other

Speciesism, commodification, and its consequences are the manifestation of the practice of *radical othering* in which nonhuman animals are reduced to bare life. Agamben (1998) describes bare life as an existence denied membership and recognition in a political community, one stripped of basic moral qualifications. As we can see, not all nonhuman animals are categorized absolutely as such. Some companion animals and police dogs are given special status. Yet let us be clear: They are still less than human. But the use of the term “animal,” of course, works in another way—as a mechanism to demean and lower *humans* to less-than-human or animal status.

Not surprisingly, the use of the category of “animal” is central to the rationalization of human-on-human violence: The same arguments that are used to render nonhuman animals expendable have been used against human racial, gender, and class groups. In race relationships between blacks and whites, as “from the misconstrued concept that humans are evolutionarily better than

animals it easily followed (to those who were predisposed to this position) that whites could be evolutionarily superior to blacks” (Spiegel, 1997, p. 21). Later, when many came to acknowledge the pathology of racist categorization, they employed nonhuman imagery and asserted that it was “wrong to treat blacks ‘like animals’ ” (p. 21).

Further, as Carol Adams (1990) writes in *The Sexual Politics of Meat*, societies that have slaughterhouses as their predominant source of food also have divided labor, with women doing more but their efforts valued less; have made women alone responsible for childrearing; have erected religious deities that are worshiped as male; and have instituted and maintained patriarchal patterns of social relationships. Adams continues that the “foods associated with second-class citizens are considered to be second-class protein. Just as it is thought a woman cannot make it on her own, so we think that vegetables cannot make a meal on their own” (p. 33). Meals made entirely of vegetables, like the French ratatouille, are considered peasant or lower-class food, and eating meat is considered a symbol of social status and a luxury (e.g., going to a steakhouse for special occasions).

Controversially, some critics go so far as to view the human-animal dichotomy as the genesis of relations of human-human domination. Hunting and gathering societies unequally divided the labor duties between men and women, thereby elevating men and devaluing woman. The sociologist David Nibert contends: “The developing mistreatment and exploitation of women and of other animals each was based upon and compounded by the other—a constant historical pattern” (2003, p. 11; see also Bulliet, 2005). Then, with the domestication of animals and the creation of agriculture, humans were enabled to invent more and more egregious, systemic, forms of domination:

Countless humans were assigned to hegemonically created social positions of “slave” and “serf” that devalued them, collectively and personally. So it was with other animals, who were relegated to such social positions as “livestock” and “game” and whose exploitation greatly facilitated the development of highly stratified and oppressive agricultural societies. Untold numbers of “others” were yoked to pestles, plows, wagons and chariots for their entire lives, while countless other individuals were used as currency or devoured as victuals—primarily by the privileged. Humans and other animals were forced to fight each other to the death to amuse elites and to distract the masses from their daily experiences and from consideration of the sources of their deprivation. (Nibert, 2003, p. 12)

Finally, as Kelly Oliver suggests, “we can become accustomed to killing and abusing people by ‘practicing’ on animals” (2009, p. 232). So, by reducing nonhuman animals to bare life, life that may be killed “without homicide or

sacrifice,” humans learn how to subordinate other living entities to bare life. Our categorization and diminishment of nonhuman animals at the symbolic level may be viewed as a template by which humans learn to marginalize and devalue—or *animalize*—human social groupings on the relational and interpersonal level (what is sometimes called in poststructural theory the imaginary domain of interpersonal relationships) and also to make distinctions among animals that, to borrow from the title of a recent book, we love, hate, and eat (Herzog, 2010).

ELEMENTS OF A DIFFERENT BIOPOLITICS

Nonhuman animals have been given little consideration in public administration scholarship despite what we hope to have established as their clear import both to the field in particular but also to the broader project of challenging orthodox political economic ordering and embedding governance in a different mode of biopolitics (Catlaw, 2007, chap. 7). But as previous advocates of an eco-/biocentric public administration rightly concluded, it is not an easy task to so profoundly reorient modernist human societies and their public administrations toward an openness to their animal-others and to disclose a “polyspecies” practice of governing. Powerful economic and political interests are enmeshed in its maintenance and expansion of the current regime of othering, commodification, and killing. Change, such as that intimated here, would amount to a disappearing of their world.

However, the challenges that American society faces in reimagining its relationship with nonhuman animals and its natural environment may be deeper and more profound than the mere politics of interest and money, the scourge of which afflicts people everywhere. The assumptions that orient humans’ attitudes toward animals have long histories and, as the historian Richard Bulliet (2005) describes, Americans—or, more precisely, dominant Americans of European descent—are especially impoverished (along with Britons, Australians, and Argentinians) by the absence of any pastoral, nomadic tradition that might act as a counterweight to the objectification and commodification of animals.

Notwithstanding these formidable obstacles, the prospects of an ever more inclusive, less violent practice of governance seems no less absurd a hope than earlier, once-utopian aspirations of and for other “less-than humans”—the abolition of human slavery or the expansion of legal protection and political recognition for minority groups, indigenous people, women, the disabled, gays and lesbians, and others.

So, *what is to be done?*

To begin, an alternative biopolitics cannot rest on an off-the-shelf ideology (Farmer, 2005) but, rather, is situational and contextual in light of the diversity of political, cultural, and material conditions humans and nonhumans face.

Having said this, we imagine that a different biopolitics begins, fundamentally, from the simple yet radical view that nonhuman animals are not mere objects, instruments, or commodities to be produced, killed, and consumed, and that they must be recognized, in some fashion, as active participants in our contemporary political community. How can this be carried forward into the world?

The Personal: Changing the Government of Everyday Life

In the personal realm of everyday governance (see Rawlings & Catlaw, 2011, for a description), we can begin to ask questions about how we live with and interact with the nonhuman animals around us. Animals are visible and invisible in ways we often do not appreciate. We may stop and attune ourselves to the silence and darkness (Stivers, 2008, p. 236) in which nonhuman animals exist. For example, as Steven Wise writes:

the blood of a slaughtered cow is used to manufacture plywood adhesive, fertilizer, fire extinguisher foam, and dyes. Her fat helps make plastic tires, crayons, cosmetics, lubricants, soaps, detergents, cough syrup, contraceptive jellies and creams, ink, shaving cream, fabric softeners, synthetic rubber, jet engine lubricants, textiles, corrosion inhibitors, and metal machining lubricants. Her collagen is found in pie crusts, yogurts, matches, bank notes, paper, and lubricants. (2002, p. 11)

By attuning ourselves toward nonhuman animals and recognizing them as more than objects and instruments, we can ask questions about how or whether we will continue to eat and use animals and their byproducts, or ask ourselves whether the animals being eaten or used were capriciously slaughtered or caused to suffer unnecessarily. We can pose questions to *all* the products and things we use and consume throughout our daily life and challenge ourselves to consider alternatives to the ways in which these products are made. Exploration of our food and consumer products will take us into a deeper encounter with the innards of the global supply chain and so with related issues, such as energy usage and the working conditions of human-animal producers and the objectification that takes place there. We can ask these questions in our workplaces, too. Imagine, for example, that public procurement officers became concerned about nonhuman animals in their purchasing decisions as they sometimes are about local business, minority groups, environmental issues, or living wages (Catlaw, 2009a). In sum, we can engage nonhuman animals in their everyday existence with us, begin to personalize the vast, impersonal animal-industrial complex, and bear part of the burden for the choices humans beings make about whom to kill and whom not to kill. Perhaps, at minimum, we can cultivate a sense of wonder and gratitude for these animals whose bodies give shape and substance to this modern life.

The Disciplinary: Shifting the Perspective of Public Administration Research, Policy, and Management

In the domain of public administration research, we can take a cue from the inspired work of Christine Reed (in press), who offers the best and only example of public administration research (within the field proper) that takes nonhuman animals seriously. She writes of how the federal government is legally required to protect herds of wild horses under the 1971 Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. The Department of Interior manages these herds within specific geographical domains and to a specific population target (appropriate management levels, or AML) of 26,000 horses. Populations greatly exceed this number, and “large-scale removals and long-term pastures constitute the [Bureau of Land Management’s] main approach to managing wild horses in legally-defined herd management areas.” As a result these “wild” horses are becoming increasingly “transitional” or mixed with nonwild breeds.

Reed uses Martha Nussbaum’s (2006) capabilities approach to consider “what it means for horses to flourish in the first place, and then [to] design long-term semi-natural sanctuaries.” She goes on to elaborate the known biological capacities of these horses and to consider the contexts within which their capacities could be said to flourish in order to evaluate efforts to design and manage these constructed “natural” environments. Reed concludes that the benefits of long-term pastures are mixed in terms of giving the horses the ability to exercise their known capacities and recommends that officials “develop sanctuaries, for reproducing herds if feasible, on western lands.” The article is a wonderful example of public administration scholarship that grapples with the complexities of contemporary biopolitics (what is a “natural” environment? what is a “wild horse” in this setting?) and remains acutely sensitive to the point of view of the horses and their differences (Farmer, 2005) in the governance process. Her work shows how attending to the animals’ perspectives might affect the possible policies and management practices we consider.

The Regulatory: Considering Legal Changes

We can ask about changes in how humans formally and legally regulate and institutionalize relationships with nonhuman animals. To this point, and while we recognize its limitations, there has been a steady march on the “rights front,” over the course of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, with regard to the protection and welfare of nonhuman animals. Some governments around the world have gone quite far in this area. For instance, in 2000 the High Court of the Indian state of Kerala found circus animals to be “beings entitled to a dignified existence” under Article 21 of the Indian

constitution (Nussbaum, 2006). As we write, Bolivia is set to consider the “Law of Mother Earth,” which would grant nonhuman entities and natural systems equal status with humans; the result of the profound resurgence of indigenous peoples and their biopolitical imagination in political life there (Vidal, 2011). While it is unclear what the law might mean in practice, we find the very possibility that such a notion would be set in a constitution to be worthy of note and discussion.

The Institutional: Transforming the Scope of Political Collectivity

In considering what kind of political and administrative mechanisms might facilitate and adjudicate such a transformation in the formal, political institutions of governance, Bruno Latour’s *Politics of Nature* (2004) is a fruitful location for discussion. In this book, Latour envisions a new “constitution” that creates a different political system that is not based on the human/nature division. Latour proposes a “collective” that includes humans and nonhumans alike (including even nonsentient entities, like mountains and viruses) which is oriented around the familiar question, “Can we live together?” (p. 109). It is a provocative exposition of a nonanthropocentric regime of democratic governance.

CONCLUSION

There are many critical issues concerning human/animal relations in governance and economic life that must be faced up to: the reality of the treatment of animals and the scale of killing that our political economy depends on; the emotional and intellectual capacities of animals and the role that their diminishment plays in organizing relations among the species; and the ways in which animals and their treatment intersect with important other topics of political, social, environmental and governmental concern. Engagement with these matters need entail neither the “animalization” of all humans nor the “humanization” of all other animals. But such engagement does challenge us to explore how and why “it is a misstep to separate the world’s beings into those who may be killed and those who may not” (Haraway, 2008, p. 70). This division gives shape to the world that many contemporary humans experience and restricts our political imaginations. Finally, we would contend that the exploration of the human/animal perimeter presses us to reconsider in a fundamental way how we think about *difference itself* and to use this as a fulcrum for rethinking, as Latour suggests, the ways in which the many animals and forms of life on this fragile planet can live together (Catlaw, 2009a). Such rethinking—in the domains of the everyday, the disciplinary, the regulatory, and the institutional—would put us on the road to another biopolitics, give us new possibilities for meeting the political, economic, and ecological challenges we must face up to.

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NOTES

1. The term “biopolitics” has been used by many scholars, working in many different domains. It is, moreover, not a new idea. Perhaps for as long as humans have contemplated the cosmos and sought to make sense of their place in it through myth, philosophy, and religion (Connell, 2007; Degler, 1991; Leeming & Page, 2000; Pojman, 2006; Stevenson & Haberman, 2009), they have explored the relationship of human and nonhuman life forms and sought to configure what we will call here a biopolitics, or biopolitical relationships, for their time, place, and condition. Drawing from the work of Foucault, Agamben, the discourse of transhumanism, and work in U.S. political science, we define biopolitics as the exploration of both the status of the human animal and of nonhuman entities and the “natural” environment. Biopolitics concerns the manners in and through which the “natural” or biological is used to form, frame, mobilize, and address political questions in human societies. As we elaborate next, this is a critical dimension of rethinking the contemporary political economy. See Catlaw (2007, pp. 210–211, n. 19) for a discussion of the definition of biopolitics used here.

2. More recent efforts have been made to incorporate a broad “ecological” perspective into the field (e.g., Mithen, 1999/2007) but have not explicitly sought to consider the status of the human *animal* or the status of nonhuman animals in governance.

3. We use “government” here in the more generic sense formulated by Foucault and governmentality studies—that is, as the “conduct of conduct” (Dean, 2010).

4. See Neil Badmington’s (2000) *Posthumanism* reader for an excellent compact collection of the various threads of this post- or anti-humanism.

5. One is tempted to say, too, that this view dehistoricizes and narrowly fixes human nature *qua* the speaking animal. In McSwite’s case, this can hardly be said. Say what one might about their narrative, it is quite clear that through their encounter with evolutionary biology and psychology, their Lacanian subject is thoroughly historicized, although in a somewhat problematic “world-historical” sense. See, especially, McSwite (2008).

6. Although one might be tempted to see a deep concern for animals as a modern phenomenon, this is not the case. There is an equally long, though largely buried, tradition *within* Western philosophy that contests the poor treatment of nonhuman animals. See Engel & Jenni (2010).

7. Singer’s own utilitarian position is contentious and complex, and it is not our intention here to endorse or refute it. However, it bears noting that Singer himself is not an advocate of “animal rights.” As Gary Francione explains, Singer is a “utilitar-

ian who maintains that normative matters are determined only by consequences, and he rejects the concept of moral rights for humans and nonhumans alike. . . . [Singer thinks] we should focus more on animal suffering and less (and perhaps not at all) on animal killing except to the degree that it causes suffering” (2008, p. 18). Francione goes on to argue that, for Singer, the “only self awareness that matters to having an interest in life is the sort that normal humans possess.” It is precisely this formulation that leads Singer to devalue “defective human beings.” We note here that we are not arguing one side or the other on the question of whether the primary concern should be the abolition of killing or the advancement of more humane, less-suffering-inducing techniques of killing, what Francione calls “welfarism.”

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